Cornell Law Review
Volume 86
Issue 1 November 2000

Article 1

In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs
Frank B. Cross

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (2000)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol86/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

IN PRAISE OF IRRATIONAL PLAINTIFFS
FrankB. Crosst
INTRODUCTION .................................................
I. THE CLASSIC ECONOWfC MODEL OF LrrIGATIoN DECISION
MAKING.................................................

2
3

II. THE Sy EmATICALLY SKEWED CONSEQUENCES OF
RATIONAL LITIGATION ...................................

A. Strategic Precedent Manipulation ...................
B. Limiting Precedent Manipulation ...................
C. Empirical Evidence of Repeat Player Strategic

Litigation ...........................................
Ifi.

TnE COnnXcTVE EFFECTS OF IRRATIONAL LITIGATION ....

A. Behavioral Economics Model .......................
B. Litigants' Noneconomic Motivations ................
C. The Failure of the Classic Model to Account for the
Irrational Plaintiff ..................................
IV. PoLicy IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS ...................
CONCLUSION ...................................................

5
6
8

9
15
15
19
23
24
32

Classical economic analysis suggests that parties in a lawsuit decide
whether to settle or litigate an action based solely upon calculations of costs
and potential recovery in the pendingaction. This analysissuggests that the
currentpolicy of encouragingsettlement is beneficiaL Using statisticalanalysis and behavioraleconomics, Professor Cross argues that, in fact, many
litigants do not engage in rationaldecision making and that policies should
encouragethe "irrationalplaintff." The classicaleconomic analysisneglects
the negative effect of repeat player litigants upon precedent. This Article
notes that repeatplayer litigants,particularly tort and product liability do
fendants, have a strong economic interest to engage in strategic precedent
setting and reduce their potential liability in fiture cases. These repeat
player litigants manipulate precedent by pursuing settlement in cases with
unfrienly facts, while tenaciously litigatingcases with favorablefacts. In
contrast, behavioral economic analysis suggests that many plaintiffs have
noneconomic motivations to litigate ratherthan settle, includingvengeance,
fairness, or vindication. ProfessorCross suggests that the irrationalplaintiff
may counteract the negative effects of strategic settlement by pursuinglitigation in spite of large settlement offers. Professer Cross concludes, through an
understandingof behavioraleconomics and classical economic analysis, that
settlement can result in significant inefficiencies, and that the irrational
plaintiffholds the greatest corrective potential.
t Herbert D. Kelleher Centennial Professor of Business Law, University of Texas at
Austin. President, Academy of Legal Studies in Business.
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INTRODUCTION

Rational choice theory, characteristic of economic analysis, argues that people are rational maximizers of wealth and typically suggests that this is salutary.' In many circumstances, the theory is
probably right. This Article argues, however, that many litigants, especially plaintiffs, do not in fact act in the classical "economically rational manner,"2 and that this putative irrationality produces a far
better and more economically efficient legal outcome than would litigants acting consistently with the dictates of classical economic rationality. In so doing, this Article employs a combination of classical and
behavioral economics. One key implication of this fact is that policies
favoring the settlement of litigation may be undesirable. This
counterintuitive claim, apparently contrary to traditional economic
behavior rationality, is in fact actually rationally grounded. While
classical economics understandably prefers voluntary agreements such
as litigation settlement, the efficiency and often the fairness of volun-

tary agreements can collapse in the presence of significant externalities. A fundamental outcome of litigation, and perhaps its greatest
benefit to society, is producing precedents that define the lav, affect
subsequent decisions, and influence private economic behavior. However, such precedents are in many respects externalities or public
goods because the litigants themselves cannot capture much of the
benefit associated with a precedent that their case creates. Consequently, the voluntary agreements of rational actors, failing to account
for the external benefits of precedent, may not yield an efficient
outcome.
Moreover, some strategic, rational litigants can use the litigation
process to obtain externalities (precedents) that favor their private situation even at the expense of the public good. Not all litigants have
the same incentive or ability to use the process so strategically, and
therefore only some classes of litigants will be able to manipulatively
obtain favorable precedents. Such strategizing allows these litigants to
1 For a review of rational choice principles in economics and their extension in political science, see DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CnoicE THE.
ORY 1-12 (1994). The authors proceed to challenge the empirical support for the
conclusions of rational choice theory in political science. E.g., id. at 33 (noting that empirical applications tend "to suffer from two classes of methodological infirmities"). For a
response and a general defense of rational choice theory, see Dennis Chong, Rational
Choice Theory's Mysterious Rivals, 9 CRrrmcAL REv. 37 (1995). A critical perspective on apply-

ing rational choice theory to the law can be found in Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S.
Ulen, Law and BehavioralScience: Removing the RationalityAssumption from Law and Economics,
88 CAL. L. REv. 1051 (2000).
2 It is impossible to fairly say that the litigants are behaving irrationally, because it is

impossible to know their utility functions. I simply argue that they are not behaving in tie
fashion projected by economic models assuming that individuals act solely to maximize
their economic wealth.
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manipulate the government into providing them special favors. This
outcome is simply a variety of the rent-seeking thesis commonly recognized in economics.3 When effective, this practice produces unvse
precedents contrary to both justice and economic efficiency. The
presence of irrational litigants, typically plaintiffs, can restrain the manipulation and partially counteract this undesirable and inefficient
end.
This Article is broken into discrete sections that form a chain to
its conclusion. Part I sets forth as background the classic economic
model of litigation and settlement. Part I elaborates on the simple
classical model and explains how it enables rent-seeking by some parties through selective settlement and litigation. Part HI reviews the

evidence on how litigants, especially plaintiffs, do not behave as the
classic economic model predicts, and explains how apparently irrational litigant behavior serves as at least a partial remedy to the bias
created by the classic model. Part IV reviews some policy implications
of these findings, such as the undesirability of encouraging settlement
of litigation. This Article concludes that the insights of both the classic economic model and behavioral economics reveal the inefficiency
of settlement, particularly in the context of repeat-player litigants, and
asserts that policies should promote the corrective capacity of the irrational litigant.
I
THE CaAssiC ECONOMIC

MODEL OF LITIGATION

DECISION MAKING

The classic economic model of litigation is well ventilated in the
literature, and this represents only a brief summary. In the classic
model, each of the parties to an action assesses its expected financial
value.4 The expected value is calculated by estimating the probabilities of various'litigation outcomes, including a defendant's victorymeaning zero damages-and a plaintiff's victory-with the associated
range of possible damages, each with its independent probability.5
The parties then consider the additional out-of-pocket costs associated
with trying the case instead of settling.6 If the parties are relatively
close in their assessments of the litigation's value, settlement iill be in

the economic self-interest of both parties because they agree on the
likely trial outcome and will both save litigation costs by avoiding the
3

For a general survey of the concept, see THE PoLmc,.%. EcoNoMy OF R ,n'-SEEW.•

(Charles K.Rowley et al. eds., 1988).
4 E.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Maler? A Study of Srllkrnents in Sturities
Class Acaions, 43 STAN.L REv. 497, 501-02 (1991) (discussing the economic model's understanding of the process by which parties assess the value of a lausuit).
5 See id. at 502.
6 Seeid.
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trial. 7 The parties will decline to settle only when the difference in
their estimated value of their cases is greater than their combined litigation costs. The model typically assumes risk-neutrality on the part
of litigants, although some models assume risk-aversion. 8
For example, suppose that the plaintiff expected a weighted average recovery value of $55,000 from its litigation, while the defendant
valued the plaintiffs case at $45,000, independent of litigation costs.
Each side anticipated their own net litigation costs at $15,000. The

plaintiff would perceive a benefit from any settlement above $40,000
($55,000-$15,000), while the defendant would perceive a benefit from
any settlement of less than $60,000 ($45,000-$15,000), leaving a substantial zone of $40,000 to $60,000 in which the parties can reach a
mutually beneficial settlement. Both sides would view any settlement
in this range as preferable to a trial. If parties could easily calculate
the value of cases accurately, one might expect few, if any, trials, because settlement would always appear beneficial. Alas, cases are not so
easy to value, and a significant number of cases may arise in which the
valuation disparity is so wide that the parties perceive no mutually
beneficial settlement zone. The model predicts litigation when the
disparity between the parties' valuation of the claims exceeds the estimated costs of litigation. Consequently, scholars often view trials as
"mistakes" associated with disparate valuations to be avoided whenever
possible. 9
George Priest and Benjamin Klein have famously propounded
that settlement of litigation fails because of divergent expectations,
and that the difficult to value cases are those near the margin of the
decision standard employed by courts. 10 The parties readily sort out
the obvious cases and reach settlement."1 The value of close cases is
more difficult to predict, and therefore more likely to proceed to
trial.12 This yielded the "fifty percent hypothesis," which suggested
that plaintiff and defendant win rates at trial should generally hover
around fifty percent because this reflects the close cases that parties
do not settle.' 3 Whether or not this tends to produce an efficient legal end product, the litigation process itself appears efficient. Most
7 See, e.g., id. at 502 ("[A] settlement will be reached if, and only if, both partes
perceive that it would leave them at least as well off as they would expect to be after trial."),
8 For a good general economic review of the model, see Robert D. Cooter & Daniel
L. Rubinfeld, EconomicAnalysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27J. ECON. LiTtRATvRE

1067 (1989).
9 Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Bariers to Litigation Settlement: An
Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REv. 107, 108 (1994).
10 George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection ofDisputesforLitigation,13J. LEc 4L
STUD. 1, 13, 16 (1984).

11
12
13

Seeid at 16, 17.
See id.

See id. at 17.
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cases were settled because settlement was in the mutual economic interest of both plaintiffs and defendants. The model assumes that the
parties to litigation have single-peaked preferences that are limited to

their economic interest.14 The model does not accotmt for other,
noneconomic objectives that litigants may have.
The fifty percent hypothesis has been widely accepted, at least as
a starting point for additional analysis. 15 While studies have shown
that the fifty percent hypothesis often does not accurately describe
outcomes, 16 recent research embraces the fundamental claims of the
fifty percent hypothesis, and then modifies it to account for additional
factors that go beyond Priest and Klein's original model) 7 However,
these additional factors remain true to the economic model's assumptions, such as the possibility of asymmetric information. 8 The Priest
and Klein model appears widely accepted as an underlying structure
for analysis of the selection of cases for litigation.' 9 Priest and Klein
did, in fact, recognize that actual win rates might diverge from fifty
percent, due to factors beyond their simple model.2 0
II
THE SYsTMAncALLY SKEwED CONSEQUENCES OF
RATIONAL LITIGATION

The fifty percent hypothesis is too facile in its assumption that
economic dispute resolution is the only consequence of litigation and
settlement. Litigation has another crucial corollary- the creation of a
14 Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sony: The fgert Aversion Throry of Litigation Behavior,
1999 U. ITT L. REv. 43, 45 (observing that both the classical economic and behavioral
framing models of litigation "treat litigants solely as calculating creatures" and allow no
role for actual or anticipated emotion in the litigation decision.making process").
15 Even authors whose empirical results do not conform to the predictions of the fifty
percent hypothesis appear to accept the fundamental claims of tie hypothesis. E-g., Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New TheoreticalFraminwod,with EmpiricalTes$, 19
J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 340 (1990); Robert E. Thomas, The Trial Sdaction H)tpothcis IWthoit the

50 Percent Rule: Some ExperientalEvidence, 24J. LECGL SwT,. 209, 222, 226 (1995).
16
E.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial lyJijy orJftige: Transcending
Empiricism, 77 Com'ELL L REv. 1124, 1137 tbl.3 (1992) (noting that for most categories of
litigation, plaintiff win rates differ significantly from 50%); J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru
Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18J. LEc%.
STUD. 263, 283 tbl.4 (1989) (reporting plaintiff in rates for civil actions in Japan of over
75%); see also Daniel Kessler et al., ExplainingDeatioalnsfrom the Fj-PerentRule: A Mutimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEereL S-rV. 233, 238-41 tbl.1
(1996) (summarizing research finding plaintiff win rates of less than 50%).
17 E.g., Kessler et al., supra note 16; Joel Waldfogel, The S&etion H'ypothesis and the
Relationship Between Trial and PlaintifVicto;, 103 J. Pot. Eco. . 229 (1995).
18 E.g., Kessler et al., supra note 16, at 242-43.
19
Thomas, supra note 15, at 210 & n.7.
20 E.g., Priest & Klein, supra note 10, at 27 n.9 (acknowledging hint their assumptions
about parties' behavior avoids the problem of strategic litigant behavior).
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precedent.2 ' Precedents govern future decisions with similar facts or
analogous legal questions.22 The external value of precedent can substantially alter the economics of parties' litigation decision making.2
Other external factors similar to precedent can also affect these economics, such as issue preclusion, public relations, and release of information in discovery. 2 4 The precedent-setting example is easy to
understand and analogous to the other externalities, so the remainder of this Article focuses on the influence of precedent-setting's value
upon parties' decision making.
A. Strategic Precedent Manipulation
For many litigants, the precedential outcome of a case may have
little significance; the victim of an automobile accident, for example,
probably does not contemplate a future accident arising from a similar set of facts. For other litigants, though, the precedent may have
enormous value. The manufacturer of the automobile sued over this
accident has much at stake in the precedent that the court establishes.
Suppose a plaintiff alleges that an accident was attributable to the
faulty placement of a fuel tank.25 If the court holds that the vehicle
has a design defect resulting in strict liability, the manufacturer is subject to a considerable future stream of liability.2 6 The "repeat player"
21
Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why Permit NonParty Involvement in Settlements5 , 75 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 221, 228 (1999) ("There are two
primary factors in the development of precedent: which cases go to trial and therefore
result in case precedents, and what the substantive decisions were in prior cases.").
22 See id. at 234-35 (discussing the development of precedent in subsequent cases).
23 See id.
at 232-33 (acknowledging that a model that focuses on the value of precedent suggests repeat players are more likely to litigate to create favorable precedent).
24
The availability of nonmutual issue preclusion means that obtaining a favorable
outcome in a given case may preclude other parties from relitigating the issue. See, e.g.,
Richard Hynes, Comment, Inconsistent Verdicts, Issue Preclusion, and Settlement in the Presenceof
JudicialBias, 2 U. Cmi. L. ScH.RoUNDTABLE 663 (1995). Losing a trial may have a public
relations cost to the company, and merely trying an action may risk the exposure of senstive information in discovery, which adversaries might use in future litigation. For example, in General Motors Corp. v. Moseley, 447 S.E.2d 302 (Ga. 1994), a former CM safety
engineer provided damaging testimony concerning the development of the company's saddle fuel tank for its pickup trucks. Despite the company's best effort to exclude this testimony in Moseley and to limit its future use, future plaintiffs were able to use the testimony
against GM in subsequent litigation. E.g., Hannah v. General Motors Corp, 969 F. Supp.
554 (D. Ariz. 1996).
25 See Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. RFv. 1013, 101516 (1991) (describing the placement of the Ford Pinto's gas tank that caused fires upon
rear impact and resulted in liability for Ford). For a more recent example of faulty fuel
tank placement that resulted in product liability claims, see In re General Motors Corp.
Pickup Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Pickup
Truck Liability Litigation].
26 In General Motors Corp. v. Moseley, 447 S.E.2d 302 (Ga. 1994), a single plaintiff
brought a liability claim due to the faulty tank placement which eventually sparked a class
action lawsuit brought by all buyers over a fifteen-year period. See Pickup Truck Liability
Litigation, 55 F.3d at 777.
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may find considerable importance in the precedential outcome. 27
The plaintiff, by contrast, is unlikely to purchase another car with the
same fuel tank flaw; and even if she did purchase the same car, she is
unlikely to suffer an accident again.
The potential significance of precedent-setting value has indeed
been recognized, but not thoroughly explored. An article by Bailey
and Rubin sets forth a model of precedential change, and proposes
that "litigation will occur only when the party with the larger interest
in precedent would gain from upsetting or strengthening the existing
precedent 2' 8 They note that well-informed, single player parties always have an incentive to settle under the classic economic model. Repeat players, though, have a very different incentive structure.3 0
Consider a hypothetical in which both parties to the action give
the case an expected economic value of $50,000. Under the classic
economic model, they would settle and avoid the costs associated with
litigation. Now assume that one party is a repeat player who expects
the facts underlying the case to recur ten times in the near future.
With the same expected value per case, the cumulative future cost
would be $500,000 (omitting discounting). In such a case, the precedent-setting economic implications of the litigation dwarfs the economic implications of the case at hand.3 1 The positions of the
plaintiff and defendant are not comparable because the plaintiff's expected gain is limited to the particular case, while the defendant's loss
32
is equal to the value associated with a series of related actions.
How would a rational, repeat player defendant consider the precedent-setting implications of a given case? By the hypothesized nature of the facts, the defendant will confront a number of cases with
similar claims. The economically strategic defendant will examine its
portfolio of cases, and potential future cases, and identify the one that
offers the best prospects for success, thereby strategically setting a
favorable precedent. The defendant may base the determination of
these prospects on a variety of factors, including the relatively unsympathetic nature of a given plaintiff, facts unique to the complaint, the
favorability of a given forum or judge or potential appellate judges,
27

See Lederman, supra note 21, at 226 & n.32 (noting that prccedcntial Nlue of litiga-

tion is proportional to the extent that a litigant is a repeat player).
28

MartinJ. Bailey & Paul H. Rubin, A Positive Theon, ofLegal Oange, 14 L,,r'L REN. L &

EcoN. 467, 472 (1994).
29
See id. at 469-74.
30 See U
31
This example obviously involves an oversimplification of precedent. A single trial
outcome does not dictate results of all future cases. A loss at ajury trial may have relatively
little precedential impact. However, an opinion by the district court, such as pretrial summary judgment, a directed verdict, or a judgment notithstanding the verdict, will have
some persuasive precedential impact. A victory on appeal could have a much larger effect.
32
E.g., supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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and the relative ability of plaintiffs counsel. Once the defendant
identifies the case, the defendant will prosecute it, regardless of the
settlement interest of the plaintiff. Contrary to the predictions of the
classic economic model of litigation, this defendant will make no settlement offer at all.33 In the early.cases with relatively undesirable
facts or other circumstances, the dcfendant will settle in order to
avoid an adverse precedent, even if this requires an offer for more
than the case is apparently worth. If the defendant calculates accurately, and wins the first case, it will suffer fewer future claims and
have a better chance of winning those claims that plaintiffs do bring.
The defendant then can afford to try more cases, but would still settle
cases with undesirable facts readily distinguished from the initial de34
fendant to avoid an adverse precedent.
Once a court establishes favorable precedent, it will directly benefit a defendant. Thus, a judicial finding that x product design is not
unreasonably dangerous, or that y product does not cause cancer,
benefits the producer of those products in future cases.' Moreover,
given the path-dependence of precedent, the specific precedents will
add to the general body of the law and skew precedent generally in
favor of these and other defendants for future cases. 36 This fact enables repeat player parties to engineer favorable precedents. Indeed,
the manipulation need not even be by a party to a case; a third party
interested in the precedent may intervene in the case, formally or in37
formally, and settle unfavorable actions.
B.

Limiting Precedent Manipulation

On the plaintiffs' side, the strategic litigation bias for repeat
player defendants might be cured by aggregating all current and potential future victims. The law does not provide an opportunity to do
so, however, and economic principles would make it unlikely to occur
in any event. Class actions are an aggregating tool of sorts, but the law
33

In fact, research shows that defendants make no settlement offer in a significant

minority of cases. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement
Negotiations and the Selection of Casesfor Triat 90 MIcH. L. REnv. 319, 342-43 (1991).
34 Lederman also explains this theory. Lederman, supra note 21, at 231. Lederman

also discusses how the parties' settlement behavior will influence the substantive content of
precedent. Id. at 233-34.
35 See id. at 234.
36 See id. at 234-35, 241-46 (discussing the "path-dependent" nature of precedent that
allows parties to strategically influence its development).
37 E.g., Frank B. Cross, Common Law Conceits: A Comment on Meiners & Yandle, 7 GEo.
MAsON L. REv. 965, 973-75 (1999) (discussing strategic litigation and settlement); Einer R.
Elhauge, Does Interest Group TheoryJustfy More IntrusiveJudicialReview?, 101 Yx,,E L.J. 31, 78-

79 (1991) (discussing how parties will "settle strategically in cases where the type ofjudge
or set of facts seems likely to lead to unfavorable precedent"); Lederman, supra note 21, at
235-56.
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places various barriers38 and costs in the path of bringing such actions.3 9 More inherently, a class action can aggregate only those
whom a particular product has already injured, not potential future
victims. The central beneficiaries of a pro-plaintiff precedent are the
tens of millions of drivers who have not yet suffered injury, but they
are generally excluded from a class action.
A theoretically more promising aggregating tool would be
through amicus participation, for example, by some drivers' interest
group.40 Experience shows that this behavior is rare, no doubt because of the difficulties and costs of organizing a group with so many
members, and ready free riding by potential members. 41 If anything,
the opportunity for amicus participation would enhance the bias for
large repeat players because smaller groups of related potential defendants can better organize for their joint precedent-setting
interests.42
The bottom line is that economically rational litigation will result
in a set of cases being tried that systematically favors defendant victories. Individual plaintiffs may benefit from defendants' strategies by
receiving lucrative settlement offers when their cases are strong and
the defendants fear adverse precedents. But the set of remaining
tried cases are more likely to result in repeat player uins, generally in
favor of the defense in tort litigation. Particularly in product liability
actions, such as the hypothesized automobile design defect litigation,

the repeat player defendant has much larger stakes in ensuring that it
avoids an adverse precedent. Court decisions are not perfectly predictable, and defendants would not win every case, but one would expect them to win a disproportionate number of them.
C. Empirical Evidence of Repeat Player Strategic Litigation
Commentators have recognized the success of repeat players for a
while. They acknowledge that big business interests win an over38 E.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a) & (b) (describing the requirement that plintiffs must
satisfy to maintain a class action suit).
39 Paul H. Rubin, Common Law and Statute Lau 11 J. La,%. STVTD. 205, 220 (1982)
(noting that the costs and free rider problems of class litigation often preclude its use).
40 See, eg., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Pivate Ged, 8J.
lcAL SruD. 235, 274 (1979) (suggesting that groups can act as amid to advance their
collective interests).
41 See Allison Lucas, Friendsof the Court?The Ethics ofArnicus Brief Writin~gin First Amendment Litigation, 26 FoRDHAMi UPa. LJ. 1605, 1613-14 (1999) (discussing how circuit courts
are discouraging amid participation).
42
In Mancur Olson's now famous explication, "the incentive for group action diminishes as group size increases, so that large groups are less able to act in their common
interest than small ones." MANCUR OLsoN, THE RISE AND DECUNE oF Nrioxs 31 (1982)
(emphasis omitted).
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whelming proportion of their cases. 4 3 Marc Galanter published a famous article noting the phenomenon. 44 Galanter also recognized
that a reason for this phenomenon was the repeat players' concern for
the effects of litigation beyond the immediate case. 45 A study of federal appellate courts found that large enterprises are far more successful than individuals. 4 6 Other studies particular to specific areas of the
law have also noted this tendency. Paul Rubin describes the evolution
of nuisance law in the nineteenth century as a study of the law favoring "factories and firms, rather than individuals. '47 A study of product
liability claims and settlement offers indicated that firms based litigation decisions partially on their "stake in the court outcome that ex48
tends beyond the immediate court award."
The strategic precedent-setting litigation concept is unsurprising
because it is merely an example of wise business strategy. Case outcome studies demonstrate the relative significance and success of strategic defense litigation. 49 One might expect a measure of strategic
litigation in tort actions generally, but it should be most pronounced
in product liability actions. Product liability claims are more likely to
have a repeat player defendant than, for example, ordinary negligence claims, and product liability defendants may be particularly sensitive to adverse precedent.5 0 Hence, one would expect strategic
litigation to yield a higher defendant win rate in product liability actions than in other torts. The following chart depicts win rates from
the Administrative Conference of the United States database of all
federal district court decisions between 1978 and 1993.r1 The win
rates are broken down by case categories in Table 1, with product liability actions separated from other claims in the case category.

43 Terence Dunworth & Joel Rogers, Corporationsin Court: Big Business Litigation in
U.S. FederalCourts, 1971-1991, 21 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 497, 561-62 (1996).
44 Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Chang4 9 L. & Soc'v REv. 95 (1974).
45 Id. at 97-103.
46 Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Who Wins on Appeal? Upperdogs and Underdogs in the United States Court of Appeals, 36 Am.J. POL. ScI. 235, 236 (1992).
47 Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6J. LEGAu STUD. 51, 56 (1977).
48 W. Kip Viscusi, The Determinants of the Disposition of Product Liability Claims and Compensationfor Bodily Injury, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 345 (1986).
49
Infra notes 51-62 and accompanying text and tables.
50 Supra notes 25-37 and accompanying text.
51 For an evaluation of this database, see Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg,
Do Case Outcomes Really RevealAnything About the Legal System? Win Rates and RemovalJurisdition, 83 CORNELL L. Rnv. 581, 585-87 (1998). This database is accessible at Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Judicial Statistical Inquiy Form, available at http://
teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/questata.htm.
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TABLE 1
PLAINTIFF WN-RATES BY TYPE OF ACTION

Case Category
Real Property
Airplane

General Tort
58%
51%
59%
62%

Product Liability

Personal Property

60%

44%

Contract

65%

56%

Marine
Motor Vehicle

35%
38%
47%
35%

Source: Administrative Conference of the United States Database.

As expected, the plaintiff Nwin rates are lower across the board in product liability actions. The relatively high general tort rates are quite
consistent with the predictions of Priest and Klein's fifty percent hypothesis,52 although the low product liability plaintiff win rates are
suspicious and evidence that strategic litigation may be transpiring.
The relatively low plaintiff win rates in product liability litigation
are not conclusive evidence of the effect of strategic litigation. They
might be attributable to some other factor, such as asymmetric information.53 This is actually an unlikely explanation of the results reported in Table 1 because product liability actions should have less
information asymmetry favoring defendants than other tort actions.5 4
Under the asymmetric information theory, plaintiffs should do relatively better in product liability actions.5 5 To truly be sure we are see52 While the Priest and Klein's hypothesis suggests fifty percent win rates, that assumes that the only dispute was over liability. However, disputes may also arise over the
magnitude of damages. Hence, the hypothesis suggests that plaintiffs should win fifty percent of the cases involving only liability, and some unidentified number of additional cases
in which the parties may agree that a probability exists that the plaintiff uill win but cannot
agree to settle because of disagreement about the damages deserved.
53 If information about the case is asymmetric and favors defendants, plaintiffs will
make unwise judgments in settlement and bring bad cases to trial, thus reducing their win
rates. SeeLucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigationand Settlement Underlmperfed Information, 15 R%,n
J. EcoN. 404, 407-08 (1984); Robert H. Gertner, Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty, and
Selection Bias in Litigation 1993 U. CHi. L Scsi. ROL'NDTABLE 75, 89-92 (1993); Keith N.
Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 22 J. LEmt. STUD.
187, 188-89 (1993); Kessler et al., supranote 16, at 24243; see also ThomasJ. Miceli, Selknent Strategi, 27 J. LzcA.L SrUD. 473 (1998) (discussing two economic models of settlement involving asymmetrical information that defendants may use to their advantage).
54 See Bebchuk, supra note 53, at 414 (observing that a negligence rule grants an as mimetrical informational advantage to defendants); John Cirace, A Thraoy of Negligence and
Products Liabilliy, 66 ST. JoHN's L REv. 1, 63-65 (1992) (analyzing greater informational
asymmetries for negligence versus strict products liability actions); William K.Jones, Stric
LiabilityforHazardousEnterprise,
92 CoLuM. L REv. 1705, 1759 (1992) (noting relative informational disadvantage of plaintiffs under negligence standard).
55 See Hylton, supranote 53, at 199-200 (noting that plaintiffs have a win rate lower
than fifty percent for product liability litigation due in part to the outcome's dependence
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ing strategic litigation effects in the results, however, we must consider
the corpus of settled cases as well.
Some information on settlement and trial does support the strategic litigation theory. For example, research suggests that medical malpractice defendants consider the effects of precedent when making
settlement offers, as the probability of going to trial was inversely related to the plaintiff's probability of success at trial.56 Evidence on
strategic litigation might be found from analyses of individual judges'
trial rates and win rates. 5 7 In the presence of such litigation decisions,
judges appearing to be pro-plaintiff would have fewer trials as defendants settled to avoid adverse precedent.
Information on settlement rates is scarce, butJoel Waldfogel provided data on win and trial rates for twenty-three judges in the Southern District of New York.58 Waldfogel's article gives trial rates and
plaintiff win rates for all cases and for three larger subdivisions of
cases: contract claims, property rights claims, and tort claims. 59 This
Article hypothesizes that tort defendants are more likely to be repeat
players who see precedential value to litigation, 60 and thus are likely to
settle cases before judges that appear to be pro-plaintiff. The inclusion of all tort claims, rather than just product liability actions, might
dilute this tendency, but it should still be greater than in property and
contract actions, in which both sides could have comparable interest
in precedent. 61 Table 2 shows the results of a regression of plaintiff
win rates and trial rates by judge for the three types of cases. The first
row is a coefficient (with T-terms in parentheses) and the second row
is the RF for the simple regression.
TABL

2

W N RATE AND TRIAL RAT BY JUDGE

Tort
Contract
Property
-. 626*** (3.678)
-. 145 (.673)
-. 243 (1.15)
.363
.014
Source: Joel Waldfogel, The Selection Hypothesis and the Relationship Between
Trial and Plaintiff Victory, 103J. POL. ECONL 229 (1995).
upon the defendant's level of compliance and informational advantage about its compliance efforts).
56 Patricia Munch Danzon & Lee A. Lillard, Settlement Out of Court: The Disposition of
Medical Malpractice Claims, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 345, 367 (1983).
57
See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
58 See Waldfogel, supra note 17, at 243 tbl.3.
59 Id.
60 Supranotes 42-43 and accompanying text.
61
See Waldfogel, supra note 17, at 253-55 (discussing the variation of asymmetry in
various types of cases); see also Hylton, supra note 53, at 199-200 (making a distinction
between various tort disputes and noting low plaintiff win rates in product liability actions
due to the defendants' informational advantage).
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For tort cases, judges with a record of high plaintiff win rates in tort
actions consistently tend to have lower trial rates, with a high level of
statistical significance (less than .01). 6 2 The R2 means that strategic
litigation explains over 36% of the variation from a random relationship, and it might have been larger had the study been more focused
on product liability or other actions that have more repeat player defendants and associated strategic precedent-setting litigation.
One can also observe the unreality of the dassic economic model
by examining the offers that are made by defendants. Gross and
Syverud have found that in a substantial minority of cases-around
25%-the defendants make no settlement offer, or a zero offer.63
Under the classic economic model, defendants should always offer at
least their litigation costs, even if the plaintiff's case is worthless.6 4
The authors suggested that defendants might sometimes make zero
offers "in order to bring cases to trial in which they hope to set formal
or informal precedents that affect future cases."6 5 Other possible explanations may exist for the zero offers, but when combined with the
empirical evidence on win rates and trial rates, it appears that some
strategic precedent-setting litigation is occurring.
The existence of strategic litigation is most obvious and straightforward in the practice of settlement and vacatur. Some circuits allowed litigants to settle decided actions conditioned upon the vacatur
of the opinion. 66 This enabled them to escape the precedential effects of an undesirable opinion by eliminating it.67 Repeat player major companies and the U.S. government were most interested in using
vacatur. 68 While the settlements are typically sealed, evidence shows
that the parties might pay substantially for vacatur.6 9 The repeat play62 Walfogel did not conduct this statistical test but observed that plaintiffs lose a
higher than expected number of tort cases and attributed the fact to differential stakes.
Waldfogel, supranote 17, at 252-53.
63 Gross & Syverud, supra note 33, at 343.
64 See id. at 342-43 (noting that such offers should be "rare" under the Priest and Klein
hypothesis).
65
66

Id. at 343.

For a circuit-by-circuit review of approaches to vacatur, see Judith Resnik, liose
judgmient? VacatingJudgments,Preferencesfor Settlenent, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close
of the Twentieth Centuy, 41 UCLA L REv. 1471, 1484-85 n.55 (1994).
67
See Howard Slavitt, Seling the Integrit, of the Systan of Precedent: Sdcctire Publication,

Depublication, and Vacatur, 30 I-utv C.R.C.L. L REv. 109, 136 n.173 (1995) (describing
how institutional litigants employ vacatur to "erase negative precedent").
68 See Elizabeth M. Horton, SelectivePublicationand the Authority ofPredent in the United

States Courts of Appeals, 42 UCLA L REv. 1691, 1713 (1995) (reporting that vacatur efforts
are primarily made by corporations and the government); Resnik, supra note 66, at 1489
(observing that U.S. government and the Product Liability Advisory Council, whose members include dozens of companies, fought for preserving vacatur rights).
69

E.g., Resnik, supranote 66, at 1490 n.79 (citing one case that was actually settled for

an amount greater than the lower court amard, presumably in compensation for vacatur of
the opinion).
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ers made the payments to rig the law for their benefit, and this demonstrates the monetary value of a favorable settlement before the
facL 70 The general availability of vacatur would eliminate the need

for strategic settlement, because defendants could erase their losses,
but the Supreme Court disapproved of the practice. 7 1 Consequently,
strategically selective litigation is now the most effective way for parties
to obtain precedential value.
The implications of strategic litigation are that the law would be
inexorably driven in a path favorable to repeat player litigants. This

equity bias would simultaneously produce economic inefficiency as
well. 7 2 Authors have claimed that the common law tends toward effi-

cient results, because inefficient decisions will be relitigated until the
court reaches an efficient result.7 3 Because the theory assumes recip-

rocal stakes in legal rule, repeat player strategic litigation will produce
a pattern of litigation that favors the repeat player even when a different rule would be the more efficient one. This result occurs even if
judges are affirmatively seeking efficient rules.7 4 This rational business behavior of strategic litigation distorts the law in an undesirable
and inefficient way. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to counteract
through policy means because it is the product of thousands of separate negotiated settlements that parties have an indisputable legal
right to reach.
The evidence of strategic litigation and precedent-setting is clear,
but not overwhelming. While defendants win most product liability
actions, plaintiffs win a respectable minority of cases. 75 While defendants often settle cases before unfavorable judges, those judges continue to hear some tort actions. 76 While the path of precedent often
See Horton, supra note 68, at 1712 n.116.
See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18 (1994). In addition, vacatur sometimes proved ineffective in expunging the precedent. See Resnik, supra
note 66, at 1473-74 (noting thatjudges may sometimes rely on vacated precedents ofwhich
they are aware, and others would refuse to vacate their opinions).
72 See Rubin, supra note 39, at 211-14 (discussing how precedent-setting litigation
would drive the law away from the most efficient substantive outcome).
73 The efficient rule would impose liability upon the least cost avoider. George L.
Priest, The Common Law Process and Selection of Efficient Rules, 6J. LEGAL STUD, 65, 67 (1977);
Rubin, supra note 47, at 54. When a legal rule violates this principle, there is a deadweight
loss, so the overall stakes of the case would be greater. Priest, supra, at 67; Rubin, supra
note 47, at 54. The higher stakes make litigation more likely and thus increase the likelihood that the inefficient rule will be overturned. Priest, supra,at 67; Rubin, supra note 47,
at 54. ContraJohn C. Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common Law, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978).
74 See Gertner, supra note 53, at 77-78 (observing that a "judge may adopt a rule or
standard that is 'optimal,' for the types of cases that are litigated, but that is not the same
rule the judge would adopt if fully-informed about the set of disputes that are affected by
the rule").
75 Supra Table 1.
76 Supra Table 2.
70
71
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favors defendants, even a casual observer is aware of some significant
plaintiff wins. The reason for these outcomes may be that some defendants are not acting strategically, or that they are ineptly strategizing. But a more important factor weighing against strategic litigation
arises once we abandon the classic economic model's assumption of
rational behavior. The following section discusses this factor.
III
TiHE CoRREc

- EFFECTS OF IRRATIONAL LrrGATION

The unfortunate consequences of strategic litigation are inexorable under the classic economic model of litigant decision making.
The classic model of litigation assumes that all parties are economically rational, in the sense that they seek to maximize only their economic wealth.7 7 However, evidence indicates that litigants, perhaps
especially plaintiffs, do not act in the manner prescribed by the classic
78
economic model.
A.

Behavioral Economics Model

Behavioral economists have criticized the classic model as an inaccurate description of human reality. Much of behavioral research
has focused on decision-making heuristics that are inconsistent with
rational choice economics. 7 9 For example, the research has shown
that people are poor estimators of probability and employ logical fallacies in decision making.8 0 Insofar as these claims are true, they would
not fundamentally alter the manipulation of precedent, but they
would add random noise to rational choice models of settlement,
which could have some counteracting effect.
Another aspect of behavioral economics considers the
noneconomic aims of individuals,8 1 and this effect could systematically counteract the efforts of repeat players to manipulate precedents
and thereby yield a more efficient, and therefore just, state of the law.
77

SeeJohn C. Harsanyi, Rational-ClwiceModels of PoliticalBehaviorvs. Functionalistand

Conformist Theories, 21 WORLD POL 513, 518 (1969) (discussing the "extreme simplicity" of
the classic economic model's assumptions, "which make economic self-interest virtually the
only motivating force of human behavior, at least in economic acthities").
78 Infra notes 108-25 and accompanying text.
79
Kg., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristicsand
Biases, 185 Sci. 1124, 1130 (1974). For a thorough review of behavioral economics as applied to the law, see Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 9. The application of behavioral

psychology can also reveal factors that affect the settlement of litigation. George Lowenstein et al, Self-Serving Assessments of Fairnessand PrerialBargaining,22J. Lru. STUD. 135,

138-39 (1993) (noting that a "self-serving bias" uill cause parties to misvalue litigation in
their favor).
80
See, e-g., Frank B. Cross, The Public Role in Ris
(1994) (discussing cognitive limitations of public).

81

Control 24 F_,vrm. L 887, 899-904

See Korobkin & Guthrie, supranote 9, at 146-47.
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For example, plaintiffs may litigate for reasons other than purely financial ones and may not be willing to settle for even a lucrative offer
from the defendant that exceeds their likely award at trial. 82 If so,
defendants who make large settlement offers to sympathetic plaintiffs
may not succeed in avoiding a precedent because these plaintiffs may
refuse even highly lucrative offers. 83 These plaintiffs may have objec84
tives other than economic recovery behind their lawsuits.
The theory that people have motivations and goals that are not
purely economic is not exceptional. The reduction of all human goals
to a common monetary currency has more to do with the convenience
of economic modelers than the reality of human experience. 85 Cass
Sunstein has recently reviewed the literature and noted that at least
some of the time people care about fairness, and "they will sacrifice
their material self-interest in order to promote those goals."86 A study
of the wage negotiating process confirmed that people may "reject
economically dominant offers because of social concerns."8 7 The presumption that people make mathematically rational decisions aimed
only at maximizing their economic well-being is not an accurate portrayal of real life decision making. 8 It is a "clearly established empirical fact that many important aspects of everyday economic and
political behavior cannotbe explained in terms of this over-simple theory of human motivation."8 9
Models that reduce behavior to wealth maximization have at least

three particular shortcomings. The first shortcoming is their failure
to consider "expressive preferences." Expressive action is "performed
for its own sake, with no apparent rational consideration of material
consequences for the actor."90 This expressive action may pursue any
82
83
84

Id.
Id

See infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1054 (suggesting that in law and economics, "[m]athematical elegance often becomes the primary goal, with usefulness in the
realm of law, which combines logic with human experience, a mere afterthought").
86 Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Law and Economics: A Progress Report, 1 Am. L. Eco.
85

REv. 115, 121-22 (1999).
87 Victoria Husted Medvec et al., Concession Aversion: A Story of Loss and Betrayal
(Aug. 4, 1999) (unpublished manuscript at 4, on file with author).
88
Barbara A. Mellers et al., DecisionAffect Theoy: EmotionalReactions to the Outcomes of
Risky Options, 8 PSYCHOL. Sci. 423, 423 (1997). The authors state that:

Most theories of decision making treat choice behavior as a cognitive pro-

cess; people assess their values, define their goals, and take actions to
achieve those goals. But anyone who has ever made an important decision
knows that what really happens is not that simple. People often base decisions on emotions.
Id.
Harsanyi, supra note 77, at 519.
Robert P. Abelson, The Secret Existence of Expressive Behavior,9 CieicAu Rlv. 25, 27
(1995); see also Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive
89
90
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number of ends, from the artistic to the ideological. One might suspect that people become professors of law and write law review articles
largely for such expressive reasons. Psychological research shows that
"instrumental pursuit of self-interest is a sometime state of mind," and
that individuals in various circumstances prefer other objectives.9 1 Expressive behavior provides "psychological satisfaction," if not financial
92
retur.
These models' second deficiency is the failure to account for a
plurality of values. Some contend that humans have a plurality of values, both monetary and expressive, and that reducing all these values
to a single metric is foolish.9 3 They contend that these values may be
incommensurable-that people reject tradeoffs among their different
qualitative values. 94 The commensurability of values, such as economic and noneconomic, implies the existence of a cardinal scale,
such as dollars, by which one may trade them off.9 5 Requiring people
to make such tradeoffs among incommensurable values compels the
"commodification" of noneconomic ends.9 6 The existence of a ariety
of human objectives suggests that utility acts "primarily as a vector
(with several distinct components), and only secondarily as some homogenous magnitude." 9 7 The ends cannot necessarily be reduced to
a single metric; qualitatively different ends are arguably incommensurable. 98 The debate between economists and philosophers over matters of incommensurability and commodification is unsettled.
Although the notion of incommensurability supports the position that
the classic economic model does not describe litigant decision making, this position is not dependent on that notion. Even if the finanHarms, and Constitutionalism,27J. LGAL STUD. 725, 755 (1998) (noting that an "expressive
harm is one that results from the ideas or attitudes expressed through a governmental
action rather than from the more tangible or material consequences tie action brings

about").
91 Abelson, supranote 90, at 34.
92

Harsanyi, supra note

77, at 525.

93

Eg., Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, SlingingAraws at Demorcra:Sotial
Choice Theoor, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics 90 COLUM. L REv. 2121, 2148-53
(1990) (discussing how individuals have a plurality of values that are not hierarchically
commensurable).
94 See generally Richard Warner, Impossible Comparisons and Rational Choice Thtory, 63 S.
CAT- L REv. 1705, 1716-17 (1995). The theory of incommensurability vs the topic of a
recent lengthy symposium. See Symposium, Law and Iucommensurabiit, 146 U. P. L RE-.
1169 (1998).
95 See Warner, supra note 94, at 1717.
96 E.g., William HJ. Hubbard, Civil Settlnent DuringRape Prosemutions 66 U. C. L
REV. 1231, 1241-42 (1999) (discussing concerns that rape settlements will commodify the
right to rape).

97 Amartya Sen, Plural Utiliq, 1980-81 PROC. AmsroTrmz.

Soc'v 193, 193.

See Martha C. Nussbaum, Rawed Foundations:The PhilosophicalCritiqueof (A Particular
T)pe oJ) Economics, 64U. Cm. L REV. 1197, 1199-1203 (1997). The author's review of philosophical literatures concludes that "there is no good reason to suppose that commensurability is a prerequisite of rational choice in the normative sense." Id. at 1202.
98
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cial and emotional ends of litigation were indeed commensurable, the
noneconomic ends could predominate and overcome the predictions
of the classic model of settlement.
Finally, these models fail to recognize the assertions that we perceive separate spheres in life, and that people maximize their income
in the economic sphere, but act for other ends in other spheres, such
as the political sphere. 9 9 People may have different preferences, and
priorities among preferences, when acting in their "citizen" role than
they do in their "consumer" role. 10 0 In the consumer role, people
may strive to maximize their economic welfare, while in the public
citizen role people may place a higher value on noneconomic values.1 01 An individual's priorities with respect to private goods are not
necessarily identical to goals with respect to public goods.

While some evidence supports the distinction between citizen
and consumer roles, proving the irrationality of plaintiff behavior
need not even turn on whether people act differently in different contexts. Ample evidence shows that people may not act to maximize
their wealth even in the economic sphere. 10 2 Daniel Kahneman's classic
article, which examined the significance of fairness in economic markets, found that members of the community had standards for decid-

99 See, e.g., GEOFFREY BRENNAN & LOREN LomASK, DEMOCRACY AND DECIsION; THE
PuRE THEORY OF ELEcroRAL PREFERENCE 19-52 (1993) (arguing that individuals seek mone-

tary returns in the market context but have more expressive objectives in the political
context); Jeffrey Friedman, Economic Approaches to Politics,9 CarncAL REV. 1, 4 (1995) (observing that the "economic realm could be defined as the arena in which selfishness is considered legitimate," so "[i]t is only to be expected then, that-to some extent-people will
internalize and be guided by unselfish norms in noneconomic realms").
100 Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, ConsumerPreferences, Citizen Preferences, and the Provision of
Public Goods, 108 YALE LJ. 377, 378 (1998) (discussing the distinction, and indicating that
the consumer role, "evoked in market settings, reflects people's self-regarding wants and
interests, the [citizen role], aroused in political settings, reflects their opinions, values, and
beliefs regarding the good of society as a whole"); see also Amitai Etzioni, The Casefor a
Multiple-Utility Conception, 2 ECON. & PHIL. 159, 171 (1986) (discussing the contrast between
various understandings of people's utility preferences when voting); Amartya K Sen, RationalFools: A Critique of the BehavioralFoundationsofEconomic Theny, 6 PHIL. & Pun. Anu. 317,
329-33 (1977) (discussing people's various preferences within the public and private
spheres); Cass P. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences,EnvironmentalLaw, 22J. LEGAL STUD. 217,
221-35 (1993) (emphasizing that preferences must be understood within a contextual
sphere rather than as "acontextual" preferences); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social
Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 923-25 (1996) (discussing the different goals of people acting
in their citizen and consumer roles).
101
See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 100, at 381-82 (noting that individuals who disregard the environment and the poor in their private transactions may vote for or otherwise
support government policies to protect the environment and help the poor).
102 See generally Carol M. Rose, EnvironmentalFaustSuccumbs to Temptations of Economic
Mephistopheles, or, Value by Any Other Name Is Preference, 87 MICH. L. Rv. 1631, 1635-39
(1989) (arguing that the distinction between citizen and consumer realms is unfounded,
but that noneconomic preferences play a material role in the consumer realm as well).
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ing whether companies set fair prices and wages. 103 For example,
people considered it unfair for a hardware store to raise snow shovel
prices in the wake of a local snowstorm. 104 More significantly for pre-

sent purposes, individuals will act to punish companies that behave
unfairly, even at some cost to themselves. 1' 5 Within the economic
marketplace, "many aspects of people's behavior cannot be explained
without recognizing that many individuals are motivated partly by
noneconomic and/or nonegoistic motives." 1 6
B.

litigants' Noneconomic Motivations

This general evidence on motivation and shortcomings of the rational behavior model surely extends to litigants. In fact, specific evidence indicates that plaintiffs have litigation objectives other than
economic ones. Still others simply want a day in court, regardless of

the outcome of the trial. 10 7 Of course, many litigants are primarily
interested in economic ends, but the presence of a substantial number with noneconomic ends will alter others' ability to manipulate the
path of precedent. Robert Solomon emphasizes that the law is "infused with and motivated by emotion," such that "any conception of
law in purely dispassionate terms threatens to be inhuman." 0 3 The
clearest evidence of the importance of emotions such as vengeance
comes from defamation actions. One study found that the primary
motivating factors for defamation litigation "are restoring reputation,

correcting what plaintiffs view as falsity, and vengeance." 0 9 litigants,
like others, may "sacrifice their own economic interest in order to impose punishment" on others." 0 A plaintiff "will be more likely to re103 Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairnessas a Constrainton Profit Sd:ing: Entitleents in the
Market, 76 Am. EcoN. REv. 728, 728-29 (1986).
104 I& at 729.
105 See genealy id at 734-36 (describing experimcntal research).
106 Harsanyi, supra note 77, at 519.
107 Eg., Deborah 1. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts:My)ths and Realities 1989 U. ILa.
L RE:v. 89, 99 (observing that the "most frequently cited objective of lay litigants in adjudicatory proceedings was to 'tell my side of the story'"); Roy D. Simon,Jr., The Riddle of Rule
68, 54 GEO. WASH. L REV. 1, 63 (1985) (observing that a plaintiff "may want to complete
the process of litigation in order to feel that she has had her day in court," even when a
"settlement would be more favorable than the outcome at trial").
108 Robert C. Solomon, Justice v. Vengeance: On Law and the Satisfaction of Ernaoion, in
TIE PAwsioNs oF L ,w 123, 128 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999).
109 Randall P. Bezanson, The Libel Suit in Retrospect: lSiat Plaintiffs Want and IITiat Plain.
tifs Get, 74 CAi.L Rr. 789, 791 (1986).
110 Sunstein, supra note 86, at 122; see also Sally Engle Merry & Susan S. Silbey, lI7tatDo
Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Concept ofDispute, 9Jusr. Sv.J. 151, 153 (1984) (suggesting
that the plaintiff wants "vindication, protection of his or her rights (as he or she perceives
them), an advocate to help in the battle, or a third party who will uncover the 'truth' and
declare the other party wrong"); David A. Rammelt, "Irdnerelt Power" and Rude 16: Hoaw Far
Can aFederalCourtPushthe Litigant Toward Settlement?, 65 L'i. LJ. 965, 1001 (1990) (reporting that "there are some disputes in which the litigants' primary motihation for filing suit

20
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ject a settlement offer if they view the offeror as morally blameworthy

or as disrespectful of their claim.""' Indeed, the very fact that the
offer comes from the defendant may be viewed as a reason to reject it,
12

regardless of amount.'
The noneconomic goals of plaintiffs are not limited to defama-

tion actions. In fact, these goals may be common among tort plaintiffs
who seek vengeance or vindication that results from winning a decision." 3 Plaintiffs in sexual harassment actions "seek a vindication of
their right to be treated with dignity fully as much as they are seeking
monetary damages." 1 4 The traditional tort doctrine of nominal dam-

ages recognizes the fact that non-monetary motives drive some plaintiffs. 1 5 Motives such as vengeance may be closely related to the justice
system. Adam Smith wTote that the "violation of justice is injury ...
[and] it is, therefore, the proper object of resentment, and of punishment, which is the natural consequence of resentment.""u 6 A casual
observation of litigation suggests "the presence of anger, resentment
and vindictiveness is the motivating force behind the persistence, the
obstinacy, the economic irrationality, and the ruinousness of a great

many lawsuits."" 7 The American Law Institute has considered "social
grievance redress" to be among the central purposes of tort law. 18
The parties may gain value from the "act of litigating" itself.1 ' 9 For
example, "highly emotional issues" characterize malpractice actions,
does not involve monetary compensation or redress, but rather involves an overwhelming
element of personal vindication").
111 Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 9, at 109-10.
112 This has been called a "reason-excluding commitment": a commitment "not to consider or entertain a gain with respect to some normative criterion." Matthew Adler, Law
and Incommensurability: Introduction, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169, 1182 (1998). It would be
analogous to a revolutionary refusing to betray a revolution for any amount of monetary
gain. Id.
113

Solomon, supranote 108, at 134 (suggesting that the "purpose of liability and tort

law may be to compensate the victims and to encourage responsible behavior, but it is also
to punish those who are responsible for the victims' plight").
114 Michele Lang Palter, ADR in the Sexual Harassment Context, in, NAT'L INST. ON SLrx
UAL HARASSMENT. A MULTI-DIsCIPLINARY VIEW OF THE NEv GENERATION OF SEXUAL HARAsS
MENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES AND A TRIAL OF A SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASE

(ABA Ctr. for

Continuing L. Educ. 1998), available at WL N98SHCB ABA-LGLED J-13.
115 The Supreme Court has recognized that parties can recover nominal damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 even in the absence of any actual recoverable damages from the

violation. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978).
116 Solomon, supra note 108, at 126 (quoting ADAm SmrrH, THE THEORY OF THE MORAL
SENTIMENTS).
117 Solomon, supra note 108, at
and listen very hard to the plaintiffs
vindictiveness of their legal actions.
118 1 AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS'
JURY 26-27 (1991).

135. He suggests that "[o]ne does not have to look
in a great many liability suits to be convinced of the
('Those bastards are going to payl')".
STUDY, ENTERPRISE REsPONSIBILITv FOR PERSONAL IN-

119 Frank B. Cross, TheFirst Thing We Do, Let'sKillAll the Economists: AnEmpiricalEvalu.
ation of the Effect of Lauyers on the United States Economy and PoliticalSystem, 70 TEX, L, REv.
645, 660 (1992).
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and both plaintiffs and defendants in these actions may be pursuing
20
noneconomic objectives.'
An experimental study by Korobkin and Guthrie considered the
effects of noneconomic values, called "equity seeking," on the settlement decision.' 2 ' They hypothesized a landlord-tenant dispute, and
structured it so that they could modify the blameworthiness of the
landlord's behavior, without altering the value of the litigation.'2
They found that subjects had a substantially lower probability of accepting a given settlement offer when the landlord had been intentionally unresponsive to problems the tenant faced.'23 The authors
concluded that "[w]hen litigants feel they have been treated badly by
the other side, the chances of settlement decrease because litigants
are more likely to seek retaliation or vindication of their moral position in addition to monetary damages." 2 4 Even the presence of an
apology by the landlord did not eliminate the noneconomic, indic12 5
tive objective of plaintiffs.
Moreover, direct survey evidence of the litigation process shows
that the decision to settle or litigate is not a purely economic one.
One study surveyed trial lawyers to discern why a set of twenty-two
cases failed to settle. 126 Of this sample, only six failed to settle exclusively for the valuation disparity reasons which the clssic economic
model suggests.' 2 7 Noneconomic factors predominated among expla-

nations of failure to settle. 128 The authors explained:
That a verdict is rendered determining the merits of the dispute is also of importance to many litigants. One side is declared a
winner and the other a loser, one is right and the other wTong; one
is vindicated and the other defeated. Many parties, both plaintiffs
and defendants, perceive this as the greatest benefit of proceeding
to trial and obtaining a verdict. The reverse of this is equally true;
settlement avoids a determination that one of the parties may find
undesirable.
Closely related to vindication are feelings of anger toward the
opponent and a desire to inflict punishment. Trial is an expensive
and emotionally debilitating experience for both sides, but often
tieJuiy SIadow, Lx: &
Thomas B. Metzloff, Resolving Malpractice Diputes: Imaing
120
Tinter & Spring 1991, at 43, 76-80. The author notes that
CoNmraP. PROBS.,
"[malpractice plaintiffs may well view trial as the culmination of their efforts to hold a
phIsician accountable." Id. at 79.
121
Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 9, at 144-47.
122
Id- at 144.
123
I& at 146.
I&at 147.
124
125 Id- at 147-50.
126 Peter Toll Hoffnan, Valuation of Casesfor Settlemen: Throai and Practi, 1991J. Dis,.
REsoL 1, 2.
127 Id. at 29.
128 I at 36-38.
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one side's anger towards the other is so great that a trial is forced in
order to impose costs on the opponent, even though the other side
1 29
will also incur costs.

These noneconomic considerations were a factor in a majority of the
cases litigated, and were the only factors precluding settlement in

eight (36%) of the cases.' 30 The author emphasized that "litigation is
131
not a purely economic process."
A study of appellate litigation found somewhat different

noneconomic motivations at this later stage of the litigation process.1 32 After losing at trial, many appellants did not really expect to
win on appeal. 133 Nevertheless, they continued to litigate, in pursuit
of process. The survey found that parties "viewed the appellate pro-

cess itself as able to demonstrate to opposing parties the inappropriateness of their behavior," and the "fact that the appellate court would
treat their claims seriously seemed to vindicate the appellants' perceptions of the appropriateness of their claims.' 134 Economic factors

were secondary to the decision to appeal. 135 Appellants sought a fair
process, or the retribution that would result from forcing the appellee
to participate in additional proceedings, regardless of the outcome. s6

Moreover, while typical tort plaintiffs are not repeat players who
would derive economic benefit from a favorable precedent, they may
have the sociotropic goal of setting a precedent that would assist
others who may be similarly situated future plaintiffs. A sense of altruism may motivate peoples' decisions. Such altruism may be "affective," in which a person gains utility from the happiness of others, or
nonaffective, in which the utility takes the form of a pure internal
concern for others.' 3 7 In either event, the results are similar and contrary to the expectations of the classic economic model.
Considerable evidence indicates that altruism may play a major
role in peoples' decisions. Examples include "voluntary reductions of
water-use during droughts, conservation of energy to help solve the
energy crisis .... donations to public television stations, and many
129
130

131
132

Id. at 36 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 36-37.
Id. at 28.
Scott Barclay, Posner'sEconomic Model and the Decision to Appeal 19 JusT. Sys, J. 77

(1997).
See id. at 88-89.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 91 (reporting that appellants did not base appeals on economic factors or a
cost-benefit analysis of the prospects of appeal). Others, including Richard Posner, have
observed a similar practice at the trial level. Id. at 90.
133

134
135

136

Id. at 90.
See generallyJane Allyn Piliavin & Hong-Wen Charng, Altruism: A Review of Recent

137
Theory and Research, 16 ANN. REv. Soc. 27 (1990) (discussing the sources of altruism and
whether it is motivated by personal utility or concern for others).
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forms of voluntary labor."138 According to one estimate, the value of
voluntary labor is $74 billion annually. 139 Ample research demonstrates that human behavior is not explained simply by maximization
of economic self-interest. 40
C.

The Failure of the Classical Model to Account for the
Irrational Plaintiff

The classic economic model's focus on income maximization is
not required by the principles of economics. 14 1 In fact, it is contrary
to those principles. Economists coined the mythical currency of the
"utile" in recognition of the fact that people have ends other than
monetary ones.1 42 In his Nobel lecture, Gary Becker declared:
Unlike Marxian analysis, the economic approach I refer to does
not assume that individuals are motivated solely by selfishness or
material gain. It is a metlod of analysis, not an assumption about
particular motivations. Along with others, I have tried to pry economists away from narrow assumptions about self-interest. Behavior is
driven by a much richer set of values and preferences.
The analysis assumes that individuals maximize welfare as they
conceive it, whether they be selfish, altruistic, loyal, spiteful, or
45
masochistic.'
Judge Posner has declared that economists "long ago abandoned the
model of hyperrational, emotionless, unsocial, supremely egoistic,
nonstrategic man." 144 Perhaps this is true in the abstract, but classic
economic models, such as that of litigation, commonly imply the
model of the hyperrational actor. 145 Economists have used the in138
REv.

Matthew Rabin, IncorporatingFairnessinto Game Theoir and Economit., 83 A. Eco.
1281, 1281 (1993) (citations omitted).

Id (citing BuRToN A. NVEISBROD, THE NorN'PRorr EcoNo.my (1988)).
In addition to the sources above, see Amrrms Ermoz,, THE Momt. D,.,tc'szoN-: ToWAID A NEW EcONOMICS 51-66 (1988) (discussing how human behavior is not compatible
139
140

with income maximizing); Norman Frohlich &Joe Oppenheimer, Bf'ond Economic Man:
Altruism, Egalitarianism,and Dfference Maximizing, 28J. CONFLuCr REsoL 3, 21 (1984) (argu.
ing that altruism and egalitarianism play an important role in choice).
141
Economics assumes that people act to maximize their utility but does not necessa-

rily assume that the utility is monetary. SeeD. BruceJohnsen, We1alth Is Value, 15J. LE.
STuD. 263, 268-69 (1986) (defining an economic good as "anything ofwhich more is preferred to less").
142 Economists created the term "utile" as a nonmonetary standard unit of utility. Se,
eg., Ward Edwards, The 77eoy of Decision Making, 51 PsYcHoL. BULL 380, 392 (1954).
143 Gary S. Becker, Nobd Lecture The Economic lay of Looling at Behavior, 101J. PotEcoN. 385, 385-86 (1993).

144

Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Bdafioral Economics, and the Law, 50 Srn. L

Rzv. 1551, 1552 (1998).
'45
Eg.,Jeffrey L Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market llusions: The Limits of Lauw and
Economics, 33 UCLA L. RE%'. 1309, 1320 (1986) (suggesting that "narrow self-interest7 is "the
behavioral assumption most commonly employed by those appl)ing economic anal)sis to
law").
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come-based assumption for convenience in modeling, but it does not
accurately describe reality.' 46 Thejump from the thin rational theory
that individuals pursue their preferences to the thick rational position
that all actions aim to maximize individual economic wealth is
147
unjustified.
This richer theory of litigant motivation alters the classic economic model and reduces the opportunities for strategic manipulation of precedent by repeat player defendants. When plaintiffs are
not responsive to lucrative settlement offers and insist on litigation,
more cases will go to trial and those cases will include more plaintiff
wins. 148 Plaintiffs with stronger, winning cases likely have stronger desire for vengeance against defendants and greater emotional commitment to prevailing in court. Such vengeance surely obstructs
settlement negotiations and causes rejection of even lucrative offers
from defendants. 149 The noneconomic motivations many plaintiffs
feel will thus counteract the strategic manipulation of precedent, at
least to some degree. 150

IV
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS

This Article's argument centers on the descriptive claim that economically irrational decision making by litigants has a positive effect
on justness and efficiency in the law. This finding also has policy im146 Because a theoretical model by its very nature simplifies reality, simply calling a
model reductionist is not much of a criticism. However, the model must capture much of
reality in order to be useful. See Douglas G. Baird, The Future ofLaw and Economics: Looking
Forward,64 U. CH. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (1997) (reporting that "[e]conomists aim to capture
as much of the dynamics of behavior as they can with the fewest possible assumptions," so
"the question is not whether economists' assumptions are unrealistic, but whether they
capture enough of what is at work to allow us to see basic forces operating in an otherwise
impenetrable maze"); see also Lewinsohn-Zanir, supra note 100, at 384-85 (noting that
nothing in economic theory denies the existence of noneconomic values such as altruism
and that economists acknowledge this fact, but in practice economists "usually prefer to
explain behavior using narrowly defined self-interest").
147 See, e.g., Harsanyi, supranote 77, at 515 (noting that "[o]nce we adopt this broader
concept of rationality, we are no longer restricted to the analysis of human behavior in
pursuing some fixed goals, but can extend our analysis to changes in people's goals"). For
a discussion of the distinctions between thick and thin visions of rational choice, see
Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 9, at 164-65.
148 See Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, Emotional Responses in Litigation, 12 IN'L REv. L.

& EcoN. 31, 3640 (1992) (describing how litigant motivations such as anger, pride, or
vengeance can reduce settlements). Although vengeance itself may not be an emotion but
an outcome, it is usually associated with emotions such as vindictiveness.
149 Solomon, supra note 108, at 137 (noting that the "desire for vengeance blocks any
sincere negotiation").
150 The data presented in Part II suggest that defendants still win a preponderance of
product liability and other cases. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. However, the
counteracting effect of plaintiffs' noneconomic motivations may reduce the magnitude of
this effect.
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plications and lends weight to arguments for an alteration of the currently prevailing litigation policies. The central implication is that we
should not encourage the settlement of litigation.
Owen Fiss made the classic case against settlement; he complained that settlement was a "capitulation" to be "neither encouraged
nor praised."' 5 1 While he expressed some concern about the practical
biases of the settlement process, 15 2 his case was essentially a philosophical one. Fiss questioned the authenticity of the consent expressed in
a settlement. 153 He seemed most focused on public law litigation,
such as civil rights actions. 5 4 Fiss fundamentally recognized, though,
that interests in settlement and in forming precedent conflict. The
roots of this Article's arguments may be found in Fiss, but this Article
seeks to make the economic argument much more explicitly than he
did.
The preference for settlement ignores the external precedent-setting benefits of litigation to judgment. 5 5 Fiss hinted at this point
when he observed that adjudication consumes public resources, which
are provided so that litigation can "interpret [public] values and to
bring reality into accord with them."' 6 He emphasized that even the
"civil lawsuit" should be conceived "in public terms." 5 7 While Fiss
seemed focused on the justice of the outcome of the particular dispute, his claim is even stronger when one considers precedent. Producing a precedent does not merely bring "reality" into accord with
public values in an individual dispute, it pronounces those public values as guidance for private actors and promises replication of those
values in ensuing analogous disputes.' 5 8
The classic public goods case against settlement suggests that lack
of litigation will yield an absolute lack of public goods, that is, precedents. Landes and Posner explained how our court system produces

rules that are valuable to nonparties in their future planning. 5 9 The
"[r]ules and precedents" that result from private litigation have "obvious importance for guiding future behavior and imposing order and
certainty on a transactional world that would otherwise be in flux and
151
152

Owen M. Fss, Against Selemen 93 YALE LJ. 1073, 1075 (1984).
Id. at 1076. Fiss suggested that poorer litigants would have less ability to predict the

outcome of litigation and therefore settle improvidently, be sufficiently desperate for income to accept a low settlement, or lack the resources necessary to finance the full pursuit
of their litigation. Id.
153 Id. at 1078-82.
154 E.g., id. at 1087 (using desegregation litigation as his exanmple and perhaps conceding that his claim applies to only a limited number of cases).
155
Supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
156 Fiss, supranote 151, at 1085.
157

1-58
159

Id. at 1089.
Supranotes 21-24 and accompanying text.
See Landes & Posner, supra note 40, at 236.
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chaos.' 160 The precedents "benefit not only the parties to a lawsuit,
but third parties as well." 161 While precedents are the most obvious
public good associated with litigation, prosecuting a case may have
other public benefits as well.1 62 Because litigation and precedent-setting entail external benefits, they will not be produced at optimal
levels. 163 Individuals have no incentive to maximize such external
benefits, for which they must bear the entire cost in litigation expenses. The broad public, which has an interest in optimizing the
external benefits, will be unable to organize for this end,'6 or in the
case of litigation, may be barred by procedural doctrines. 65 Ordinarily, "an important role of government is to use its coercive powers to
guarantee the production of public goods."'1 66 In this context, government uses its coercive powers to encourage settlement to avoid the
production of public goods! The position seems prima facie irrational. Yet, at this point in the argument, it is possible to defend a
policy encouraging settlement. Even with various encouragements to
settle, litigants produce a lot of precedents. Maybe courts should produce more decisions and opinions, but it is hard to argue that a
shortage of precedents is a central problem in America today.
The public goods case is a different and stronger one: the problem is not so much the absolute shortage of precedent as a skewing of
precedent. Precedents are not only a public good, they also may be
private goods, produced by interest groups to benefit themselves. 167
The analogy to legislation is instructive. Legislation is typically seen as
creating a public good. Yet it is widely recognized that rent-seeking
lobbying may employ legislation to create private goods at the expense of the commonweal. 168 Litigation presents the same risk, as ex160 David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. LJ. 2619, 262223 (1995).

161

Jules Coleman & Charles Silver, Justice in Settlements, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, Autumn

1986, at 102, 114; see also Patrick E. Longan, Congress, the Courts, and the Long Range Plan, 46
Am. U. L. REv. 625, 662 (1997) (discussing how precedent has "public value").

162 Luban, supra note 160, at 2625 (explaining that "the discovery and publicizing of
facts, which may subsequently be used by political actors, ordinary citizens, or other agents
in the legal system (litigants as well as lawyers), is a public good created by adjudication").
163
See, e.g., Coleman & Silver, supra note 161, at 115 (noting that "settlements reduce
the number and variety of legal opinions").
164 Mancur Olson provided the classic exposition of why large groups of individuals,
such as the general public, cannot effectively organize. MANCUR OLSON, TH-. Lowc oF
CoLLEcrivE AcTION (2d ed. 1971).

165
For example, standing doctrine restricts the ability of a party to represent the general public in litigation. Frank B. Cross, TheJudiciary and Public Choice, 50 HAsTINcS Lj.
355, 363-66 (1999).
166
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1139.
167
Cross, supra note 165, at 366.
168 William N. Eskridge,Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, StatutoryInterpretationas PracticalReasoning,42 STAN. L. Rxv. 321, 334 (1990) (describing statutes as a "deal between rent-seeking
groups and reelection-minded legislators").
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plained in Part 11.169 Legislating for private interests should be
frustrated just as we should put barriers in the path of rent-seeking
litigation.
Part I suggests that litigants, especially tort plaintiffs, behave in
an economically irrational fashion, rejecting settlements that appear
efficient and beneficial for all parties to a lawsuit, thereby preventing
some rent-seeking manipulation of precedent. But this evidence does
not mean that such litigants remain wholly oblivious to economic consequences. The threat of a substantial penalty for failure to settle may
well overcome such litigants' noneconomic moral resistance to settlement.170 Hence, public policies favoring settlement may perversely
enhance the rent-seeking opportunities of litigation.
Courts and legislatures create various policies designed to encourage the settlement of litigation. 7 1 These policies aim to reduce
the transaction costs of litigation to courts and parties and also to encourage win/win agreements for the parties to litigation.'t ' These
goals are set without thought for the effects on precedent.17 3 Various
informal judicial practices serve the preference for settlement. Many
judges cajole, pressure or manipulate litigants to settle.' 74 This informal preference for settlement is acknowledged in formal legal rules.
Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides an example of a rule that punishes a party's refusal to settle.' 75 The rule dates

back to the origin of all the rules of civil procedure in 1938.176 Rule
68 requires plaintiffs who reject settlement offers greater than the
amount eventually won at trial to pay the defendant's costs of trial.17 7
169
For a general discussion of how interest groups can use the courts for rent-seeking,
see Cross, supra note 165, at 356-57.
170
Infra notes 175-86 and accompanying text.
171
Infra notes 172-86.
172 E.g., Lederman, supranote 21, at 259.
173
d. at 222 (noting that "courts, commentators, and federal policy seem to favor
settlement, while little attention is given to precedent that may be lost in the process").
174
Coleman & Silver, supra note 161, at 105-06 (describing how judges encourage settlement by "playing on counsels' hopes and fears ... by suggesting that close calls may be
decided for or against a particular party, by praising the quality of counsels' efforts, and by
emphasizing the common interest the judge and counsel have in settling the case and
moving on to other matters"); Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 9, at 108 n.5 (discssing
how "[c]ourts have devised a number of procedures aimed at promoting settlement");
Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HAR,,. L REv. 374, 376-77 (1982) (discussing how
judges aggressively encourage settlement of litigation).
175 FED. R- Crv. P. 68.
176 FED. R. Civ. P. 86(a).
177
FED. R Crv. P. 68. More precisely, the rule is potentially invoked by a defendant
who makes a settlement offer after a lawsuit is filed but more than ten days prior to a trial.
Id. The plaintiff has ten days in which to accept or reject that offer. Id. Suppose that the
plaintiff rejects the offer, and the trial yields ajudgment for the plaintiff ith damages less
than those offered in settlement. In this circumstance, Rule 68 directs that the plaintiff
must pay the litigation costs incurred by the defendant after the offer was made. Id. For a
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Historically, courts have not extended Rule 68 to the defendants' attorneys fees, so the punishment for refusal to settle is limited to public
fees and therefore not too severe.17 8 However, courts have interpreted Rule 68 to encompass post-offer attorneys fees in cases in
which the law gives a prevailing plaintiff the right to recover attorneys
fees.' 7 9 This interpretation is especially ironic, because those are the
cases in which Congress has found a public interest in encouraging
litigation by a grant of attomeys fees. One district court has unilaterally expanded the application of the rule to include recovery of attorneys fees.180 In addition, scholars have proposed extending Rule 68
to provide for attorneys fees in all actions. 81' Given the potential
magnitude of such fees, Rule 68 now may impose quite an onerous
financial burden on plaintiffs who reject settlement offers.
Various states have passed laws or adopted rules that roughly
trace the provisions of Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
but provide even more settlement pressure on plaintiffs. California,
for example, has a rule that enables plaintiffs or defendants to make
offers of judgment and provides for the shifting of fees when a trial
outcome is inferior to the settlement offer. 182 The California law goes
even further by requiring a plaintiff to remit some of the damages
83
recovered at trial if the judgment does not exceed the offer.' Colorado's law provides for recovery of attorneys fees when an outcome is
inferior to a rejected settlement offer. 18 4 Wisconsin's statute actually
requires the party that rejected the offer to pay twelve percent interest
per year on the amount recovered, dating from the time of the ofgood summary of the rule's operation, see generally Lesley S. Bonney et al., Rule 68: Awakening a Sleeping Giant, 65 GEo. WAsH. L REv. 379 (1997).

178

SeeJenny R. Rubin, Rule 68: A Red Herringin Environmental Citizen Suits, 12 Guo, J.

LEcAL Em-ics 849, 853 (1999) (noting that if the "costs include only court and other litiga-

tion fees, the risk of such an assessment plays only a minimal role in a plaintiff's determination of whether to accept an offer ofjudgment or proceed to trial").
179 E.g., Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1985); see also Rubin, supra note 178, at

853 (noting that "most environmental statutes include attorneys' fees in their definition of
costs" which could make a plaintiff liable for the defendants attorneys' fees under Rule
68).
180 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Chevron Chem. Co., 885 F.Supp. 934, 937-39 (E.D.
Tex. 1995), abrogated by Ashland Chem. Inc. v. Barco Inc., 123 F.3d 261 (5th Cir 1997).

For a discussion of this remarkable decision, see Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy?
Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DuKE L.J. 929 (1996).
181 E.g., William M. Schwarzer, Fee-shifting Offers ofJudgment-An Approach to Reducing

the Cost ofLitigation, 76JuDicA-uarE 147, 149 (1992). Commentators discuss this and other
proposals in Bruce P. Merenstein, More Proposalsto Amend Rule 68: Time to Sink the Ship Once
andforA, 184 F.R.D. 145, 150-55 (1999), and Richard Mincer, Note, Rule 68 Offer ofJudg
ment: Sharpen the Sword for Suft Settlement, 25 U. MEM. L. REv. 1401, 1418-30 (1995).
182
CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 998 (West. 1980 & Supp. 2000).
183 Id. § 998(e).
184
CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-17-202 (1997).
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fer.18 5 In Florida, litigants who decline to settle may also be liable for
the defendant's attorneys fees.18 6
Rule 68 and the parallel state laws are theoretically dubious.
Functionally, they delegitimize all noneconomic motives associated
with litigation. Suppose that a defendant in a fraud action offers
$100,000, the plaintiff rejects the offer, and the trial yields an award of
$80,000 for the plaintiff. Such a plaintiff might not be at all disappointed in having taken the case to trial. The outcome of trial, conceived as both the $80,000 monetary award and the noneconomic
benefits of vindication, exposure of wrongdoing, and the like' 8 7 might
well exceed the value of the $100,000 settlement offer in such a plaintiff's mind. Yet Rule 68 almost conclusively says that this cannot be
so.18 The rule declares that the settlement offer was preferable and
punishes the plaintiff for failing to accept it. Hence, it punishes plaintiffs for pursuing noneconomic motives in litigation. It is quite a theoretical irony to find a rule that punishes parties for seeking abstract
justice and declares that the courts should be open only to utterly

materialistic ends. The existence of the rule even tells plaintiffs that
the judicial system considers their noneconomic ends illegitimate and
may cause them to question their commitments.
There is an even more serious instrumental problem with Rule
68. Rule 68 and its policies appear perverse and unwise. Although the
rule seeks to encourage settlement for economic efficiency reasons,
the policies facilitate strategic settlement and precedent manipulation
by repeat players with noneconomic motives to deter litigation. This
instrumental criticism is bolstered by the direct and facial import of
settlement-encouraging rules such as Rule 68.189 While the rules permit precedent manipulation by repeat-players, the rules functionally
establish a government policy against one-shot litigants' vindication of
185
186

Wis. STAT. ANN. § 807.01(4) (West 1994).
FLA. R. Cxv. PROC. ANN. 1.442 (West Supp.

2000).

187 See supra Part II.B.
188 This sentence is slightly exaggerated. Courts have recognized, for example, that
nonmonetary injunctive relief won at trial may be considered in valuing the trial outcome.
E.g., Lish v. Harper's Magazine Found., 148 F.R.D. 516,520 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that
equitable relief in defamation action was more favorable than monetary value of settlement offer). The exaggeration is only slight, however. This author has found only one
case in which the courts have even considered noneconomic values other than equitable
relief in valuing the trial outcome. Rogers v. City of Va. Beach, No. 98-2253, 1999 WL

498707, at *3 (4th Cir.July 15, 1999) (refusing to apply Rule 68 because the plaintiffs Fair
Labor Standards Act victory had external benefits to all city employees). Moreover, a plaintiff surely has considerable uncertainty over how a court would value noneconomic ends.
See, eg., Bonney et al., supra note 177, at 414 (noting that "[d]ctermining the weight to give
to any injunctive or other equitable relief is, at best, a guessing game for the court and, at
worst, a vehicle by which a result-oriented court can achieve an outcome at odds ith the
purpose of the rule").
189

In

addition

to Rule

68, see supra notes 170-74 and accompan)ing text.
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their noneconomic motives through litigation. 19 0 That policy is not
frankly defended, though, and it would be particularly difficult to defend in a nation in which a primary, if not paramount, goal of courts
is to do justice. The best defense for such a policy would be one of
economic efficiency, yet the policy is in fact contrary to such efficiency, because it enables greater manipulation and skewing of
precedent.
The more that refusal to settle is economically punished, the
more difficult it will be for plaintiffs to resist settlement in favor of
noneconomic aims. Noneconomic motives are significant to human
decision making in general and to litigation in particular. The fact
that money is not everything, however, does not mean that it is nothing. The evidence of noneconomic motives should not cause one to
ignore the simultaneous relevance of economic motives. The relevance of both motives is best illustrated in a classic story about George
Bernard Shaw. 191 At a dinner party, he purportedly asked a woman if

she would spend the night with him for a million pounds and, though
taken aback, she agreed. Then he asked if she would do so for five
pounds. Her response was "What kind of a woman do you think I
am?" Shaw replied that they had already established that and now
merely were haggling over the price. The story may be apocryphal,
but it establishes a truth that at some financial level our self-interest
may overcome our emotions or principles. Seldom if ever are values
or goals lexically ordered: a relationship that implies that even the
smallest amount of goal Xis always preferable to goal Y19 2 Instead, it
is common that a party may prefer some amount of noneconomic X to
economic Y, but as the story of the socialite suggests, a sufficient economic consideration may drive the party to subordinate his or her
concerns for the noneconomic X 193
The principle is even more true when the trade off involves a
prospective financial loss rather than a gain. Behavioral research
shows that parties tend to be risk-averse and fear the loss of a given
amount of money more than they value the gain of that same
amount.' 94 Rule 68 clearly imposes a loss on an onsettling party, so its
190

See supra Part III.B.

191
192

THE SAYINGS OF BERNARD

SHAW 64 (Joseph Spence ed., 1993).
On the nature and rarity of lexical orderings among people, see Richard Craswell,

Incommensurability, Welfare Fxonomics, and the Law 146 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1419, 1456-57 (1998).
193

One might expect the Sierra Club to be especially devoted to noncconomic envi-

ronmental objectives and relatively less responsive to economic concerns. But the Sierra
Club recently suggested that if federal law were interpreted to require it to pay attorneys'

fees in cases in which it does not prevail, it would "stop bringing cases." Marcia Coyle,
Should Defendants Win Fees?, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 20, 1999, at B1.
194 Behavioral economics has conclusively established that people do not weigh losses

and gains equally; rather, individuals are particularly averse to out-of-pocket losses. Eg.,
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
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application is regarded especially seriously. The imposition of defendants' litigation costs on plaintiffs may even amount to coercion.1 95

Hence, punishing a refusal to settle may substantially encourage settlement, even at the expense of noneconomic concerns. 190G
The reason for encouraging settlement may be for the precise
purpose of discouraging litigation from vindictive motives. The intrinsic deontological value of such motives may be debated.' 9 7 However, the rules encouraging settlement ignore the substantial
instrumental virtue of such motives in pursuing litigation and creating
public goods, while minimizing the amount of strategic manipulation
of precedent. Nothing about the law necessarily rules out the legitimacy of noneconomic motives. To the contrary, doctrines of nominal damages and other nonmonetary relief demonstrate that
substantive law recognizes noneconomic motives.1 98 Hence, there is
no intrinsic legal reason to aggressively encourage settlement at the
expense of plaintiffs' noneconomic ends. Of course, settlement of a
large percentage of cases is pragmatically vital, given limited judicial
resources. But noneconomic objectives are not so pervasive as to pre-

EcoNo mrmcA 263, 279 (1979) (discussing this finding in the context of the endowment
effect).
195 Rg., Bonney et al., supranote 177, at 417 n.266 (noting that the "importance and
appeal of current Rule 68 rests in the rule's ability to coerce parties into settlement.").
196 The trial lawyer survey discussed above to demonstrate the significance of
noneconomic motives suggested that those motives declined in significance as the economic stakes grew larger. Hoffman, supranote 126, at 37 (noting that "economics did ...
place a limitation on the exercise" of noneconomic motives and that settlement was more
likely when more was at stake economically). The survey of appellants similarly led to an
"impression that cost could accumulate to a level for the losing litigants where it would

have precluded their appeal." Barclay, supra note 132, at 93. For empirical eidence on
how economic factors in fact influence settlement, see Gary M. Fournier & Thomas 1%
Zuehlke, Litigation and Settlement: An Empirical Approadh, 71 Ray. Eco-.. STr. 189 (1989).
197 .- g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approadt to Law and Economic; 50 Sir,. L
REv. 1471, 1499 & n.70 (1998) (noting that prominent philosophers argue that motives
such as spite are not worthy of consideration).
198 Regarding relief, see supra notes 113-20 and accompan)ing text. Noneconomic
values are recognized in other legal doctrines. Standing, for example, may be predicated
on noneconomic injuries. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154
(1970). Wrongful death doctrines have recognized the need to compensate the
noneconomic value of children. Steven P. Croley &Jon D. Hansen, The Nonpecuniary Costs
of Accidents. Pain-and-SufferingDamages in Tort Law, 108 HAv. L REv. 1785, 1908 (1995).
Even in intellectual property actions noneconomic values have been recognized. Ag., Martin Luther KingJr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., 296 S.E.2d 697, 706
(Ga. 1982) (holding that King's estate had sufficient noneconomic interest in precluding
marketing of his bust). The same is true of telecommunications law. MCI Telecomms.
Corp. v. FCC, 675 F.2d 408, 415-416 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (recognizing cost allocation in telecommunications as based in part on fairness and other economic values). Many forms of
equitable relief reflect plaintiffs' monetary objectives. However, injunctive relief in defense
of constitutional rights, for example, reflects a nonmonetary end. Free speech, procedural
due process, and other similar rights are protected regardless of economic losses.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1

clude settlement altogether. 199 The question is whether decisions to
eschew settlement and proceed with litigation are desirable at the
margin. This Article urges that they are.
CONCLUSION

Behavioral economics criticizes classical economics for failing to
describe the reality of human behavior, which arguably leads to undesirable policy prescriptions. Yet one can criticize much behavioral economics for failing to make accurate descriptive predictions or to
produce policy prescriptions that are demonstrably superior to those
of classical economics. This Article demonstrates how behavioral alterations of the classic economic model can produce more accurate
descriptions of human actions and how these descriptions lead to certain policy conclusions. Richard Thaler, perhaps the most prominent
behavioral economist, asks all to agree that the following propositions
are false: "(1) Rational models are useless. (2) All behavior is rational." 200 The goal should be synthesizing economically rational
objectives and other factors.
The prevailing battle between law and economics and behavioral
economics is thus misguided. The conventional rational decisionmaking presumptions of classic law and economics are amply demonstrated to a degree, but the theory does not explain all behavior completely. Behavioralism is not so much an alternative to law and

economics as it is a complement. It supplements the classic model
and explains why deviations may occur from the model, but it does
not supplant that model. Both models are valuable only insofar as
they explain actual behavior, and their descriptive validity can be
tested empirically, yielding the knowledge necessary for policy.
Legal analysis should employ both theories, according to their
predictive abilities. This analysis can obviously inform legal decision
making. Settlement of litigation traditionally has appeared desirable
to both lawyers and economists, for obvious reasons. Settlement in
many cases is a desirable end. When considering the economic consequences of strategic settlement, though, settlement may be unfortunate and inefficient. Economically irrational litigation decisions help
counteract the resulting bias and should be applauded rather than
discouraged.

199 It is well known that the vast majority of cases over many years have settled. See
Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 9, at 107 n.1.
200 Robert E. Lane, What Rational Choice Explains, 9 GRmcAL Rxv. 107, 123 (1995)
(quoting Richard Thaler).

